New Iraqi Army
From Biocrawler, the free encyclopedia.
| |
| Military Manpower | |
|---|---|
| Military Age | 18 (2004 est.) |
| Availability | males age 15-49: 6,547,762(2004 est.) |
| Fit for military service | males age 15-49: 3,654,947(2004 est.) |
| Reaching military age annually | males: 304,527(2004 est.) |
| Military Expenditures | |
| Dollar Figure | 1.3 billion (2004 est.) |
| Percent of GDP | NA (Funding comes from U.S. Goverment) |
| Military Strength | |
| Personnel | 60,000 (2005 Feb est.) |
| Tanks | 10 T-55 (2005 est.) |
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | 4 MT-LB (2005 est.) |
| Infantry Fighting Vehicles | 0 (2005 est.) |
| Artillery | 0 (2005 est.) |
| Aircraft | 0 (2005 est.) |
The New Iraqi Army is being developed by the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) with the ultimate task of assuming responsibility for all Iraqi land-based military operations following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority envisions the New Iraqi Army to be for defense only and separate from the civil police force (which will fall under jurisdiction of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior). Because of these two facts, the officer corps as well as the army in general will be much smaller than its predecessor. Units are to reflect Iraq's unique mix of regional, religious and ethnic populations and be under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
| Contents |
Background
One of the many organizations created to replace the duties of the former Iraqi army (disbanded by U.S. Administrator of Iraq Paul Bremer), the New Iraqi Army was originally intended to comprise of 3 divisions numbering 40,000 soldiers in 3 years time. It has since been frequently changing its structure in order to effectively combat the ongoing and evolving threat posed by the Iraqi insurgency.
Force Structure Overview
| Unit | Mission | Training | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regular Army | Defending against foreign threats | Eight weeks of basic training combined with follow-on operational training before deployment | |
| National Guard | Conducting tactical operations to uphold internal security | Abbreviated 3-week training course with follow-on operational training before deployment | |
| Intervention force | Counter-insurgency operations | Four weeks of leadership training for commissioned and non-commissioned officers; 13 weeks basic training and training in urban operations | |
| Commando Battalion | Providing operational support for the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Battalions | Regular Army basic training with additional instruction in counter-terrorism and unconditional warfare and | |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force | Counter-terrorism operations | Regular Army basic training; specialized 13-week counter-terrorism training course |
Currently all forces are assisting in putting down the current Iraqi insurgency.
There are also several militas operating within the New Iraqi Army. These are the Al-Mahdi Army, Badr Corps (SCIRI), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Training
CMATT's main recruiting stations are located in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The most desired recruits are individuals who have prior military service or are skilled in specific professions such as first aid, heavy equipment operator, food service and truck driver. A a recruitment target of approximately one thousand men are desired to eventually form a 757 man battalion. Soldier fallout usually occurs due to voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet training standards.
Due to the immediate demand for these battalions to become active as soon as possible, the first four battalions' officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men are being trained simultaneously (in separate groups). Notable differences in training between CMATT and former training under Saddam's regime include schooling for human rights, the laws of land warfare and tolerance in a multi-ethnic team.
Based on the philosophy used by the U.S. military to boost its own size in response to World War II -- that an army can be built faster by focusing on the training on its leadership rather than enlisted man -- CMATT has pursued a similar strategy of focusing recruiting and training on commissioned and non-commissioned officers for the remaining 23 Iraqi battalions. Upon successful completion of officer training, these groups of officers will form the battalion's leadership cadre, which will then be responsible for overseeing its own recruitment, training, and readiness of its enlisted men. It is hoped that having the Iraqi leadership train its own will overcome problems faced by CMATT's training process namely recruitment, desertion, and unit loyalty.
Once deployed, almost all units work in tandem with American units or combat advisors either through joint missions, full unit integration, Iraqis serving under U.S. leadership or Americans serving under Iraqi leadership. This operational training greatly helps Iraqi recruits successfully apply the theoretical knowledge they have learned in training into practice in the theater of operations.
Equipment
Virtually all of the equipment used by the former Iraqi Army was either destroyed by the U.S. during Operation Iraqi Freedom or was looted during the chaotic aftermath shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime. Four T-55 tanks however have been recovered from an old army base in al-Muqdadiyah and are now in service with the 1st Mechanized Division.
On February 2, 2004 the U.S government announced that Nour USA awarded $327,485,798 contract to procure equipment for both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard; however, this contract was cancelled in March 2004 when an internal Army investigation (initiated due to complaints from losing bidders) revealed that Army procurement officers in Iraq were violating procedures with sloppy contract language and incomplete paperwork.
On May 25th, 2004 the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions. The minimum bid would begin to be delivered immediately and further orders could be placed until the maximum of 35 battalion sets or September of 2006 after the first order was fully delivered.
The New Iraqi Army's adoption of American made weapons can be seen as a strategic move on the part of American foreign policy planners. It will allow the U.S. to retain significance influence over the country even after the bulk of its forces have left. Reliance on U.S. technical expertise for its sophisticated weapons systems will ensure continued American military presence in Iraq as well as handicap the New Iraqi Army from using its newly acquired technology to initiate aggression against its neighbors.
It is logically conceivable that if left to their own devices, the New Iraqi Army would likely have chosen to adopt a Russian or Russian-derivative arms platform due to cost as well as the familiarity that many (former members of Saddam's Army) have with Russian made equipment.
Branches of the New Iraqi Army
Regular Army
- 1st Division (Iraqi Intervention Force)
- 1st Brigade
- 2nd Battalion
- 4th Battalion
- 5th Battalion
- 2nd Brigade
- 3rd Battalion
- 8th Battalion
- 6th Brigade
- 22nd Battalion
- 23rd Battalion
- 24th Battalion
- 1st Brigade
- 3rd Division
- 4th Brigade
- 12th Battalion
- 5th Brigade
- 13th Battalion
- 14th Battalion
- 15th Battalion
- 8th Brigade
- 19th Battalion
- 20th Battalion
- 4th Brigade
- 5th Division
- 5th Brigade
- 6th Brigade
- 7th Brigade
Mechanized
- 1st Mechanized Division
Special Operations Force
- SOF Division
- 36th Commando Battalion
- Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion
National Guard
(absorbed into the Army proper in Jan. 2005)- 4th Division
- 2nd Brigade
- 30th Brigade
- 32nd Brigade
- 8th Division
- 1st Brigade
- 25th Division
- 42nd Division
- 3rd Brigade
- 203rd Battalion
- 3rd Brigade
- 40th Brigade
- 302nd Battalion
- 303rd Battalion
- 306th Battalion
- 307th Battalion
Challenges
The New Iraq Army currently faces multiple challenges it must overcome to establish itself as the premier symbol of authority in Iraq. These include:
The Iraqi insurgency
Based on CIA reports that coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators after the overthrow of the Hussein regime, prewar planners had only been expecting minimal if any resistance from Saddam loyalists. For a multitude of reasons, this ideal scenario has not materialized and now the New Iraqi Army faces an insurgency which has caused more coalition casualties than during the war itself. An increase in size as well as an increased sophistication in the nature of the attacks has seriously weakened the efforts of the New Iraqi Army to maintain internal security.
Lack of training
Lack of equipment
Lack of armoured vehicles
A frequently changing force structure
Since its conception, nearly all aspects of the New Iraqi Army have been in a state of constant change to compensate for the growing insurgency. This has put additional stress on the bureaucratic and administrative elements of the army which has affected the training, equipping, and readiness of Iraqi forces.
Loyalty and leadership
The "de-bathification" process undertaken by CPA Chief Administrator Paul Bremer eliminated a large proportion of top leadership in the former Iraqi Army from being recruited. This absence of valuable leadership experience has severely slowed the development of the New Iraqi Army. Perhaps the most obvious example of this lack of leadership was seen when the infamous Falluja Brigade mutinied and joined the ranks of the insurgency during the spring uprising in March of 2004.
Insufficient forces
While training of the New Iraqi Army is more or less on schedule, desertion coupled with the immediate threat posed by the insurgency has exposed how handicapped the New Iraqi Army is due to insufficient men.
Estimated needs of the New Iraqi Army
These are estimates compiled by the military research institute globalsecurity.org to predict what the New Iraqi Army needs in order to become a viable force. Numbers on the graph may change according to new developments with respect to the reconstruction of Iraq's armed forces.
| Unit | Number needed | Number currently operational | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tanks | |||
| M1A2 | 500 | 0 | |
| M60A3 | 750 | 0 | |
| APC | |||
| M2 Bradley | 500 | 0 | |
| LAV | 500 | 0 | |
| M113 | 1500 | 0 | |
| MOR | |||
| M29 81-mm | 400 | 0 | |
| M30 107-mm | 100 | 0 | |
| M121 120-mm | 100 | 0 | |
| Towed Artillery | |||
| M101/M102 | 100 | 0 | |
| M198 | 50 | 0 | |
| M114 | 50 | 0 | |
| Self-Propelled Artillery | |||
| M52 | 150 | 0 | |
| M109 | 110 | 0 | |
| M110 | 100 | 0 | |
| MRLS | |||
| M270 | 50 | 0 | |
| RCL | |||
| M67 | 100 | 0 | |
| M40 | 200 | 0 | |
| Utility vehicles | |||
| AMEV | 100 | 0 | |
| M548 | 500 | 0 | |
| Anti tank weapons | |||
| M136 AT4 | 500 | 0 | |
| M47 | 750 | 0 | |
| M113 | 1500 | 0 | |
| Attack Helicopters | |||
| AH-64 | 50 | 0 | |
| General-purpose Helicopters | |||
| S-70 | 40 | 0 | |
| SA-365n | 5 | 0 | |
| Bell 406c | 15 | 0 | |
Miscellaneous
Excluded from New Iraqi Army include:
- Former persons from regime security organizations
- Intel organizations
- Special Republican Guards
- SSO
- Ba’ath Party security and militia organizations
- Top-level Ba’ath Party members
External links
- GlobalSecurity.org article (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iraq-corps3.htm)
- BBC article on the National Guard - Army merger (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/middle_east/4133039.stm)
