Causes of World War I
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Main article: World War I
On June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo in a conspiracy involving Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb student, and several others. Though World War One was triggered by the chain of events this assassination unleashed, the war's origins lie deeper, involving national politics, cultures, economics, and a complex web of alliances and counterbalances that developed between the various European powers over the course of the nineteenth century, following the final 1815 defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and the ensuing Congress of Vienna. He was seen as an immediate threat to the European community, in general.
The various categories of explanation for World War One correspond to different historians' overall methodologies. Most historians and popular commentators include causes from more than one category of explanation to provide a rounded account of the causal circumstances behind the war. The deepest distinction among these accounts is that between stories which find it to have been the inevitable and predictable outcome of certain factors, and those which describe it as an arbitrary and unfortunate mistake.
Ideological causes
Some of the roots of the conflict arise out of specific ideologies which influenced the behaviour of politicians and other figures during the years leading up to the war.
The Rise of Nationalist Sentiment
The system of sovereign nation states, sometimes referred to as the Westphalian system, was developed in Europe from the mid-seventeenth century. Nationalism or patriotism may be seen, in part, as the popular ideological expressions of this system. To understand why European populations were eager for war in 1914, some historians find it necessary to examine the roots of such ideology.
Following the French Revolution Napoleon Bonaparte rose to power in France. Napoleon's armies marched all over Europe, bringing not only French control, but French ideas. The rise of ideas of nationalism, devotion and love for one's common people and ethnicity, increased in popularity during the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon encouraged the spread of nationalism, which he saw in his troops, to better the French war machine. The French people began to feel pride in their culture and ethnicity. The world watched nationalism for the first time and saw the power the French gained from it.
Napoleon was certainly not solely responsible for the spread of nationalistic ideas. Although the Napoleonic wars did spread the nationalistic sentiment, nationalism is a fundamental result of economic and technological factors. With increasing rates of literacy in industralising areas language became an increasingly important unifying factor for populations. At the same time language, being standarised like never before, became increasingly exlusionary. For an in depth discussion of the rise of nationalism please see the article on nationalism.
Care needs to be taken when discussing the term nationalism. Nationalism meant many different things to many different groups. In many areas nationalism was confined almost entirely to a tiny elite, while in other areas it had broader populist support. Nationalism was also frequently incorporated into other diverse political ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, or even socialism. However, nationalism, in all its guises, did represent a break from the feudal traditions of much of Europe. It is in this light that it can be seen as a disruptive influence on the old states of Europe, where aristocracies desperately tried to maintain their traditional powers.
Social Darwinism
By the late 19th century a new form of thought, growing out of Nationalism emerged. Whereas earlier forms of nationalism had emphasised community and self determination, a new form, known as Social Darwinism emerged which emphasised the competition between different national groups. Partially inspired by the work of Charles Darwin this ideology was influential especially amongst European political elites. The new ideology emphasised the violent struggle for existence between "races" or "nations" in which the weak would inevitably be destroyed by the stronger. These ideas were profoundly influential. Much of the German and Austro-Hungarian leadership feared what they saw as an inevitable battle between "Slavs" and "Germanic civilisation." Social Darwinism also influenced competition amongst states for colonies. Colonial expansion was seen as important for assuring a nation's economic and military strength in the face of rivals.
German Domestic Politics
Left wing parties, especially the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) made large gains in the 1912 German federal election. German government at the time was still dominated by the Prussian Junkers who feared the rise of these left wing parties. Some authors feel that they deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and whip up patriotic support for the government. Other authors feel that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war, worrying that losing a war would have disastrous consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it were lengthy or difficult.
Structural or Systemic Causes
Some of the causes of the war lie in the structure of European society at the time, and the way it functioned.
Unification of Germany and Italy
In the years that followed the Congress of Vienna, conflicts began springing up all over Europe between those who cried out for change, and those who resisted it. By the mid-1800s, nationalism had become an evident force. A wave of unrest was seen across the continent in the Revolution of 1848. The 1860s and early 1870s saw two great changes to the map: the unification of Italy and the unification of Germany. These two nations were formed on the basis of nationalism. German Unification was brought about by Prussia's "Iron Chancellor", Otto von Bismarck, through a series of wars from 1864–1871. The addition of two great powers in Europe fundamentally altered the balance of power.
Changes in Austria
In 1867 the Habsburg Empire fundamentally changed its governmental structure, becoming the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. For hundreds of years the Empire had been run in an essentially feudal manner with a German-speaking aristocracy at its head. However, with the threat represented by an emergence of nationalism within the empire's many component ethnicities, some elements, including Emperor Franz Joseph, decided that a compromise would have to be made in order to preserve the power of the German aristocracy. In 1867 the Ausgleich was agreed upon which made the Magyar elite in Hungary almost equal partners in the government of the Empire.
This arrangement fostered a tremendous degree of dissatisfaction amongst many in the traditional German ruling classes. Some of them considered the policy to have been a calamity for their Empire because it often frustrated their intentions in the governance of the Empire. For example, it was extremely difficult for the empire to form a coherent foreign policy that suited the interests of both the German and Magyar elite.
Throughout the fifty years from 1867 to 1914 it proved difficult to reach adequate compromises in the governance of the empire, leading many to search for non-diplomatic solutions. At the same time a form of social darwinism became popular amongst many in the Austrian half of the government which emphasised the primacy of armed struggle between nations, and the need for nations to arm themselves for an ultimate struggle for survival.
As a result at least two distinct strains of thought advocated war with Serbia, often unified in the same people.
- In order to deal with political deadlock, some reasoned that more Slavs needed to be brought into the empire in order to dilute the power of the Magyar elite. With more Slavs, the South Slavs of the Empire could force a new political compromise in which the Germans would be able play the Magyars against the South Slavs. Other variations on this theme existed, but the essential idea was to cure internal stagnation through external conquest.
- Another fear was that the South Slavs, primarily under the leadership of Serbia, were organizing for a war against Austria-Hungary, and even all of Germanic civilization. Some leaders, such as Conrad von Hötzendorf, argued that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.
A powerful contingent within the Austro-Hungarian government was motivated by these thoughts and advocated war with Serbia long before the war began. Prominent members of this group included among them Leopold von Berchtold, Alexander Hoyos, and Janós Forgách Graf von Ghymes und Gács. Although many other members of the government, notably Franz Ferdinand, Franz Joseph, and many Hungarian politicans did not believe that a violent struggle with Serbia would necessarily solve any of the multinational empire's problems, the hawkish elements did exert a strong influence on government policy, holding key positions.
Material causes
In Marxist theory and related strands of historical theory, the cause of the war is largely attributed to an alleged material dependency of advanced European nations on imperialism. By this group of theories, nations such as Great Britain and France could only maintain healthy domestic economies in the late 19th century through their control and exploitation of foreign resources, markets and territories. As a late arrival on the world stage, the German Empire would have been locked out of such advantageous positions. Intense rivalry between this emerging economic power and the incumbent Great powers would be the inevitable outcome.
Colonial Expansion
Rivalry among the powers was exacerbated from the 1880s by the scramble for colonies which brought much of Africa and Asia under European rule in the following quarter-century. Under pressure from certain groups, even Bismarck agreed to the chase for overseas Empire, adding to Anglo-German tension as German acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific threatened to impinge upon British strategic and commercial interests. Wilhelm's support for Moroccan independence from France, Britain's new strategic partner, provoked the Tangier Crisis of 1905. During the Second Moroccan or Agadir Crisis (1911), a German naval presence in Morocco tested the Anglo-French coalition once again.
Web of alliances
The complex set of treaties binding various players in Europe together prior to the war are sometimes thought to have been misunderstood by contemporary political leaders. Mobilisation by one, relatively minor, player would have a 'cascading' effect that could rapidly run out of control, involving every country. Yet leaders discussed the crisis between Austria Hungary and Serbia as if it were a localised issue. This is how Austria-Hungary's threat of 'police action' against Serbia eventuated in Britain's entry into the war:
- Austria Hungary threatens Serbia
- Russian treaties with Serbia commit it to mobilise in Serbia's defense
- Russian mobilisation kick starts the Schlieffen Plan, and the eventual invasion of Belgium
- France mobilises in sympathy with Russian ally
- Britain's treaty with Belgium commits it to defend Belgium from all aggressors
Over by Christmas
The belief that a war in Europe would be swift, decisive and 'Over by Christmas' is often considered a tragic underestimation - the theory being, that had it been widely appreciated beforehand that the war would open such an abyss under European civilisation, no-one would have prosecuted it. This account is less plausible on a review of the available military theory at the time, especially the work of Ivan Bloch, an early candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Bloch's predictions of industrial warfare leading to bloody stalemate, attrition, and even revolution, were widely known in both military and pacifist circles. Some authors such as Niall Ferguson argue that the belief in a swift war has been greatly exaggerated since the war. He argues that the military planners, especially in Germany, were aware of the potential for a long war. He also argues that most informed people considered a swift war unlikely.
Incompetence
By some historical accounts, the war was primarily the consequence of errors of judgement by European leaders, especially the monarchs of Russia and Germany. In this approach, leaders on all sides may be taken to have been too complacent about the real risk of war, or too in thrall to lobbies within their societies who favoured war. Other, specific oversights are sometimes offered as contributory to this general incompetence.
Primacy of the Offensive and War by Timetable
Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged allof belligerents to strike first in order to gain the advantage. The window for diplomacy was shortened by this attitude. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive.
Some analysts have argued that mobilisation schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganisation. Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.
The Schlieffen Plan
Germany's strategic vulnerability, sandwiched between its allied rivals, led to the development of the audacious Schlieffen Plan. Its aim was to knock France instantly out of contention, before Russia had time to mobilise its gigantic human reserves. Germany could then turn her full resources to meeting the Russian threat. Although Alfred Graf von Schlieffen initially conceived the plan well prior to his retirement in 1905, Japan's defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 exposed Russia's organisational weakness and added greatly to the plan's credibility.
The significance of the existence of this Plan is that it committed German military planners to what amounts to a pre-emptive strike at the first sign of war becoming inevitable - or Russia would have time to mobilise, and Germany would be undone. When, at the last minute, Kaiser Wilhelm II attempted to cancel the plan, to avert war, he found that it was too late - to scrap the plan would require a re-organisation of the German army that would leave Germany vulnerable for several months.
It appears that no war planners in any country had considered Germany's options, guessed at anything like the Schlieffen Plan, or advised politicians accordingly. Thus Europe's leaders debated calmly, without any sense of the requisite urgency, believing all parties would act patiently. But Germany could not afford patience.
Specific Events
The Congress of Vienna
After Napoleon's final defeat at The Battle of Waterloo, the Congress of Vienna concluded in 1815. The congress was organized by the main victors of the Napoleonic Wars: Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria. The key figure of the congress was Austria's representative, Klemens von Metternich. Metternich advocated restoring Europe to the way it was before the French Revolution. He urged Europe to create a balance of power, where no European nation was stronger than another. This became known as the concert of Europe, a system where great powers would help each other to keep the old aristocracies in power. By preventing a single monarchy in a state from falling to nationalism or liberalism it would prevent the entire continent from going up in flames under social revolution. If that were to ever happen, according to Metternich, Europe would be thrown into another continental war, as Napoleon and French Nationalism had shown. Metternich feared nationalism as a force that could tear apart multi-ethnic nations like Russia and the Austrian Empire.
The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1)
Many of the direct origins of World War I can clearly be seen in the results and consequences of The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. This conflict brought the establishment of a powerful and dynamic German Empire, causing what was seen as a displacement or unbalancing of power: this new and prosperous nation had the industrial and military potential to threaten Europe, and particularly the already established European powers. Germany's nationalism, its natural resources, its economic strengths and its ambitions to "find a place in the sun" sparked colonial and military rivalries with other nations, particularly the Anglo-German naval arms race.
A legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany following the German annexation of parts of the formerly French territory of Alsace-Lorraine. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France, giving rise to the desire for revenge, known as revanchism. French sentiments wanted to avenge not only military and territorial losses, but also the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power. French defeat in the war had sparked political instability, culminating in a revolution and the formation of the French Third Republic. Bismarck was wary of this during his later years, and tried to placate the French by encouraging their overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained. A Franco-German colonial entente that was made in 1884 in protest of an Anglo-Portuguese agreement in West Africa proved short-lived after a pro-imperialist government under Jules Ferry in France fell in 1885.
Anglo-German Naval Race
Another contributing factor to the war was the build-up of tension between Britain and Germany as a result of Germany's desire to become a naval power. The British believed that the only thing holding their vast empire together was their naval power, and consequentially felt threatened by Germany's aggressive naval policy.
Tension in the Balkans
A key ingredient in the emerging diplomatic powder-keg was the growth of powerful nationalist aspirations among the Balkan states, which each looked to Austria-Hungary or Russia for support. The rise of anti-Austrian circles in Serbia following a 1903 palace coup contributed to a further crisis in 1908 over Austria's unilateral annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, German pressure forcing a humiliating climbdown on the part of a Russia weakened (1905) by defeat at the hands of Japan and subsequent revolutionary disorder.
In addition, a power vacuum was caused by the overthrow of Sultan Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks, which had the goal of instituting a constitution.
Alarm at Russia's unexpectedly rapid recovery after 1909 fueled sentiment among German ruling circles in favour of a pre-emptive war to break alleged Entente "encirclement" before Russian rearmament could tip the strategic balance decisively against Germany and Austria-Hungary. By 1913 both France and Germany were planning to extend military service, while Britain had entered into a naval convention and military discussions with France during the previous year.
The Rise of Kaiser Wilhelm II
Under the political direction of its first Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, Germany secured its new position in Europe by an alliance with Austria-Hungary and a diplomatic understanding with Russia. Bismarck began pursuing alliances and peace treaties. He made peace with almost every nation in Europe except France. He feared greatly that a war might destroy the newborn nation he had created in the 1860s. By the time of Wilhelm I's death, a system of alliances kept a tight peace in Europe.
The ascension (1888) of Kaiser Wilhelm II brought to the German throne a young ruler determined to direct policy himself, despite his rash diplomatic judgement. After the 1890 elections, in which the centre and left parties made major gains, and due in part to his disaffection at inheriting the Chancellor who had guided his grandfather for most of his career, Wilhelm engineered Bismarck's resignation.
Much of the fallen Chancellor's work was undone in the following decades, as Wilhelm failed to renew the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, presenting republican France with the opportunity to conclude (1891–94) a full alliance with the Russian Empire. Worse was to follow, as Wilhelm undertook (1897–1900) the creation of a German navy capable of threatening Britain's century-old naval mastery, prompting the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 and its expansion (1907) to include Russia in the Triple Entente.
Berlin-Bagdad Railway
Soon after the Oriental Railway had transported its first passengers through the Balkans to Constantinople in 1888, German bankers received permission from Turkish leaders to construct a railway deeper into Turkey. By 1903, other nations in Europe had realized that Germans were planning to construct a railway which would provide a rail link from Germany to the Persian Gulf. The Suez Canal could be avoided. They feared the Bagdad Railway would permit Germans to dominate the political and economic arenas of Europe.
Historiography
The exact causes of the war have been debated with some intensity since the time the war began.
Although Allied governments blamed Germany entirely for the war. Immediately after the war much academic work was produced in a similar vein in Allied countries. However, much academic work in the later 1920s and 30s blamed all participants more or less equally. Various factors such as the network of secret alliances, emphasis on speed of offence, rigid military planning, Darwinian ideas, and the lack of resolution mechanisms were blamed by many. These ideas have maintained some currency in the decades since then. Famous proponents include Joachim Remak and Paul Kennedy. At the same time, many one sided works were produced by politicans and other participants often trying to clear their own names. In Germany these tended to deflect blame, while in Allied countries they tended to blame Germany or Austria-Hungary. The debate over "German war guilt" was quite emotional and topical in the interwar years, and some lingering resentment within Germany may well have contributed to the rise of the Nazi party, which denied German war guilt.
In 1961 Fritz Fischer wrote the enormously influential Griff nach der Weltmacht in which he blamed Germany for the war. Fischer believed that many members of the German government had overtly expansionist plans, formulated in the aftermath of social democratic gains in the election of 1912. He alleged that they hoped to use external expansion and aggression to check internal dissent and democratization. Some of his work is based on Bethmann-Hollweg's "September Programme" which laid out Germany's war aims. Fischer's work created a whole school of analysis in a similar vein, emphasising domestic German political factors. Some prominent scholars in this school include Imanuel Geiss, Wolfgang Mommsen, and V.R. Berghahn.
The "Berlin War Party" thesis and variants of it, blaming domestic German political factors became something of an orthodoxy in the years after publication. However, many authors have attacked it.
At first the idea prompted a strong response especially from German conservative historians such as Gerhard Ritter who felt the thesis was dishonest and inaccurate. Writing in the 1960s Ritter believed that Germany displayed all the same traits as other countries and could not be singled out as particularly responsible.
Other authors such as Arno Mayer, in 1967, agreed with some aspects of the theory, but felt it isolated Germany from its historical context. Mayer believes that all states acted more or less as Germany did in the years before the war. Samuel R. Williamson lays most of the blame with the Austro-Hungarian elites rather than the German in his 1990 book, Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War. Another recent work is Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War which completely rejects the Fischer thesis, laying most of the blame on diplomatic bumbling from the British.
See also
External links
- Western Front Association (http://www.westernfrontassociation.com)
- Firstworldwar.com - accessible source for primary documents (http://www.firstworldwar.com)
- Web Memorial, Netherlands, with some controversial elements (http://greatwar.nl/)
Sources
Leslie, John. “The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary’s War Aims,” Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit ed. Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer, 20 (1993): 307- 394.
Schroeder, Paul W., “Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War” in Unmaking the West: Counterfactual Thought Experiments in History, ed. Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and Geoffrey Parker. [1] (http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/papers/schroedercounterfactual.pdf)
